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A few years ago, I sent Laurence Goldstein a draft entitled 'Coming to Language: 
Wittgenstein's Theory of Language Acquisition'. Laurence being a Wittgenstein-inspired 
philosopher, I was astonished when his comments revealed a leaning toward Chomsky's 
Universal Grammar: 
 
There is one problem that you mention but don't much discuss, about which 
I still feel some unease, and that's the 'poverty of stimulus' argument. You deny 
that there is any such poverty – you talk about the child's 'multifarious practice 
and repeated exposure', but child developmentalists say that infants are typically 
exposed to very little language and close to zero correction of grammar by 
parents. I am also disinclined to ignore Derek Bickerton's evidence for the 
'language bioprogram hypothesis'. Bickerton gathered a large amount of data on 
pidgins and creoles. A pidgin has rudimentary grammar; a creole is 
grammatically complex, but the transition from one to the other is made within 
the space of one generation, suggesting that grammar is biologically hard-wired. 
 
However, a week later, Laurence wrote me the following:  
     
For the last week, I've been hanging around with my first grandchild, now 
six months old, and so have had the opportunity to assess the poverty of 
stimulus hypotheses. Of course, that environment, replete with articulate adults 
bent on amusing the child was unrepresentative. But what struck me, and this 
would be true too of the linguistically less rich environments, was the variety of 
'language-games' to which the child is exposed. Almost all the words it hears 
are interwoven with action – objects are pointed to, animal sounds are made in 
the context of stories about country life, the child is lifted and lowered to the 
accompaniment of 'up we go.....down we go' etc.  
 
In saying this, Laurence had replaced the poverty of grammatically complex instruction and 
correction with the richness of exposure to a huge variety of language-games where words, 
behaviour, context and repetition interact with each other to inculcate in a child her native 
language. 
 In this paper, I begin by unravelling some strands of the nativist argument, offering 
replies as I go along. I then give an outline of Wittgenstein's view of language acquisition to 
see if it doesn't render otiose problems posed by nativists like Chomsky, not least by means 
of Wittgenstein's own brand of grammar which, unlike Chomsky's, does not reside in the 
brain, but in our practices.  
 
1. Chomsky's Universal Grammar: the nativist argument 
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… we humans have explicit and highly articulate 
linguistic knowledge that simply has no basis in 
linguistic experience.  
Chomsky (1983) 
 
The motivations for the claim that language is innate are, for many, quite straightforward. 
The innateness of language is seen as the only way to solve the so-called 'logical problem of 
language acquisition' (LPLA): the mismatch between linguistic input and linguistic output. 
How is it that children come to know and use – at an incredible speed – linguistic principles 
they have never been taught (and indeed, that exceed the knowledge of a PhD in linguistics), 
and how is it they can produce an unlimited number of sentences from the limited data they 
are exposed to? This is also known as 'poverty of the stimulus' or the underdetermination of 
the output. The nativist solution to this problem is that linguistic principles do not have to be 
input or learned at all; we are born with them – they come in the form of an innate Universal 
Grammar. For Chomsky, then, knowledge of language is based on a core set of principles 
embodied in all languages1 and innately stored somewhere in the mind/brain of every human 
being. Let's flesh out the nativist argument. 
The syntax or structure of any language is so abstruse that it seems impossible that 
children should learn it – particularly as quickly as they do. As Green and Vervaecke write:  
 
Constituent hierarchical structure, an almost definitional feature of language, 
is just not something, by and large, that we come up against in the everyday 
world; and even when we do, it is darn hard, even for the best and brightest 
among us, to figure it out. Witness, for instance, the struggles of linguists 
themselves to adequately characterize language. … linguists have been unable 
to discover exactly what the rules are, even after dozens (one might argue 
hundreds or even thousands) of years of research. By contrast, virtually every 
child does it within a few years (with far less in the way of specialized cognitive 
machinery, and control over the quality of the incoming data, it is worth 
pointing out, than a Ph.D. in linguistics). (1997) 
 
The difficulty is compounded by the fact that the child's environment is, allegedly, of hardly 
any help. As Anderson and Lightfoot note: 'The child masters a rich system of knowledge 
without signiﬁcant instruction and despite an impoverished stimulus; the process involves 
only a narrow range of ‘errors’ and takes place rapidly, even explosively between two and 
three years of age. The main question is how children acquire so much more than they 
experience' (2000, 13-14). 
                                                     
 
 
1 In fact, nativists recognize that not all principles occur in every language, but claim that this does not prevent 
that principle from being universal as long as the principle is not broken. Indeed a principle can be claimed 
universal on the basis of its occurrence in a single language: 'In what sense can a universal that does not occur in 
every language still be universal? Japanese does not break any of the requirements of syntactic movement; it 
does not need locality for question movement because question movement itself does not occur. Its absence 
from some aspect of a given language does not prove it is not universal. Provided that the universal is found in 
some human language, it does not have to be present in all languages'; '... it is not necessary for a universal 
principle to occur in dozens of languages. ... it can be claimed to be universal on evidence from one language 
alone; 'I have not hesitated to propose a general principle of linguistic structure on the basis of observations of a 
single language' (Chomsky 1980b, 48)' (Cook & Newson 2007, 21; 23). 
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The poverty of the stimulus argument strikes at empirical or social theories of language 
acquisition by claiming that the utterances encountered by the child in experience are too 
limited2 for it to be possible to learn the language by generalizing from them, and so we are 
forced to suppose that the brain contains innate means of creating an unlimited number of 
grammatical sentences from a limited vocabulary. Hence, Chomsky's stipulation that the 
child is born with a 'language acquisition device' (LAD) which, when the child starts being 
exposed to language, recognises which language it is and sets the correct parameters for that 
particular language. Thanks to the LAD, the child knows intuitively that there are some words 
that behave like verbs, and others like nouns, and that there is a limited set of possibilities as 
to their ordering in a sentence. The LAD can enable this because it is equipped with a 
Universal Grammar (UG) which consists of invariant principles3, as well as parameters4 
whose settings vary between languages, and recursive rules to enable productivity or 
creativity. Thus equipped, the child is able to apply her built-in unconscious knowledge of 
how language works to the limited number of sentences she hears, and at an otherwise 
(allegedly) unexplainable speed5: 'Learning a particular language thus becomes the 
comparatively simple matter of elaborating upon this antecedently possessed knowledge, and 
hence appears a much more tractable task for young children to attempt' (Cowie 2008).  
Minimal exposure to 'language evidence' is necessary to trigger the various parameters 
of Universal Grammar6 (Cook & Newson 2007, 186). As for vocabulary, writes Chomsky:  
                                                     
 
 
2 Chomsky is no longer concerned by the degeneracy of the data, but only its poverty or meagreness. The 
poverty of stimulus argument now focuses on the poverty of language addressed to children (the fact that it does 
not contain the right kind of syntactic evidence) rather than on the degeneracy of the data (the fact that it is not 
always completely well-formed). This change is due to research on speech addressed to children which showed 
that it was highly regular, and so the data are arguably not as degenerate as was earlier thought. Newport et al 
(1977) found that only 1 out of 1500 utterances addressed to children was ungrammatical (Cook & Newson, 
2007, 192-3).  
3 UG is 'the sum total of all the immutable principles that heredity builds into the language organ. These 
principles cover grammar, speech sounds, and meaning' (Chomsky 1983); they are the finite, invariant, 
genetically-innate set of principles common to all languages 'by which the child can infer, on the basis of the 
limited data available in the environment, the full grammatical capacity which we think of as a mature speaker’s 
knowledge of a language' (Anderson & Lightfoot 2000, 6). UG is part of the LAD, an innate biologically-
endowed language faculty. The LAD is also known as the 'initial state' of the language faculty – the state we are 
born with; we have learned English (i.e. the language faculty reaches its 'mature state') when, by being exposed 
to it, we have learned the lexicon and set the parameters for English.  
4 This is the Principles and Parameters (P&P) Theory, according to which 'UG provides a fixed system of 
principles and a finite array of finitely valued parameters' (1995, 170). Parameters are language-specific, binary 
parameters that can be set in various ways. An example of a parameter is 'the head parameter', whereby a 
particular language consistently has the heads on the same side of the complements in all its phrases, whether 
head-first or head-last. So, for instance, English is head-first: in the house: preposition head first before the 
complement; killed the man: verb head first before the complement. Japanese is head-last. 'It may be that the 
values of parameters are set to defaults at birth, but that these can be changed across a small range of values by 
certain linguistic experiences' (Green and Vervaecke 1997). 
5 Bishop (2014) objects: 'The problem is then to explain how children get from this abstract knowledge to the 
specific language they are learning. The field became encumbered by creative but highly implausible theories, 
most notably the parameter-setting account [see note 4 above], which conceptualised language acquisition as a 
process of "setting a switch" for a number of innately-determined parameters'. I would, however, begin by 
objecting to the 'abstract knowledge'. 
6 Anderson & Lightfoot: 'the trigger experience, which varies from person to person … consists of an 
unorganized and fairly haphazard set of utterances, of the kind that any child hears' (2000, 14). 
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You just have to learn your language's vocabulary. The universal grammar 
doesn't tell you that "tree" means "tree" in English. But once you've learned the 
vocabulary items and fixed the grammatical parameters for English, the whole 
system is in place. And the general principles genetically programmed into the 
language organ just churn away to yield all the particular facts about English 
grammar7. (1983)  
 
It is, then, through the interaction between our genetically-inherited principles and the 
linguistic environment to which we happen to be exposed that a specific language emerges: 
 
… English-speaking children learn from their environment that the verb is 
may be pronounced [iz] or [z], and native principles prevent the reduced form 
from occurring in the wrong places. (Anderson & Lightfoot 2000, 6).  
 
Let's see how this prevention works in practice. Anderson and Lightfoot: 
 
The verb is may be used in its full form or its reduced form: English 
speakers can say either Kim is happy or Kim’s happy. However, certain 
instances of is never reduce: for example, the [is] underlined items in Kim is 
happier than Tim is or I wonder where the concert is on Wednesday. Most 
speakers are not aware of this, but we all know subconsciously not to use the 
reduced form in such cases. How did we come to know this? As children, we 
were not instructed to avoid the reduced form in certain places. Yet, all children 
typically attain the ability to use the forms in the adult fashion, and this ability 
is quite independent of intelligence level or educational background. Children 
attain it early in their linguistic development. More signiﬁcantly, children do not 
try out the non-occurring forms as if testing a hypothesis, in the way that they 
"experiment" by using forms like goed and taked. The ability emerges perfectly 
and as if by magic. (2000, 3) 
 
On the nativist view, then, the child is faced with a chaotic linguistic environment and 
scans it – in this case, she is looking for clitics: unstressed words that cannot stand on their 
own (e.g., The contraction of is, in 'What's going on?' or the possessive marker 's  in 'The 
man's book'). Since clitics and their behavior are predeﬁned at the genetic level, the child is 
able to arrive at a 'plausible analysis' on exposure to a few simple expressions: she concludes 
that no reduction obtains for the second 'is' in Kim is happier than Tim is or in I wonder 
where the concert is on Wednesday, and countless other cases. The child needs no correction 
in arriving at this system: the very fact that ’s is a clitic, a notion deﬁned in advance of any 
                                                     
 
 
7 Chomsky affirms having once said that 'the child has a repertoire of concepts as part of its biological 
endowment and simply has to learn that a particular concept is realized in a particular way in the language' and 
adds that '[w]hen you read the huge Oxford English Dictionary …, you may think that you are getting the 
definition of a word but you're not. All you are getting is a few hints and then your innate knowledge is filling in 
all the details and you end up knowing what the word means' (Chomsky 2000). Cook & Newson (2007) speak 
of a 'computational system' in the human mind which bridges meanings to sequences of sounds in one direction 
and sequences of sounds to meanings in the other. The lexicon is allegedly represented in the mind and the 
computational system relies on this mental lexicon. 
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experience, dictates that it may not occur in certain contexts. She now has a reason for the 
generalization that is may be pronounced as ’s does not hold across the board8.  
How this in fact goes on in the brain is of course far from clear. It is merely assumed 
that the brain is able to produce, store and evoke symbolic representations that inform or 
instruct the child when, in fact, symbolic representations can only be determined by 
conventions, not by neurons9. It seems also assumed that the child is able to understand a 
notion like clitic, for she is said to come to a conclusion about it. To reply that all the 
analysis, scanning, inferring and concluding she is said to do is done unconsciously or 
intuitively should not exempt the child from understanding, for what would be the sense of 
saying that the child arrives at a 'plausible analysis' of something she does not, and cannot, 
understand? Moreover, this is all supposed to add to her antecedent knowledge of the 
language. But what 'knowledge' of 'clitics' can an average child 'already' have at 3? Again, 
adding 'unconscious' to 'knowledge' or replacing 'knowledge' with 'cognizance', as Chomsky 
was – precisely for such reasons – compelled to do, hardly allows him to retain all the 
epistemic activity – scanning, analysis, comparing, inferring and concluding – that allegedly 
goes on in the child's brain.  
I suggest, then, that we replace this fantastical child-grammarian scenario with an 
explanation along the lines of: reducing the 's' in cases such as Kim is happier than Tim is 
makes the sentence incomprehensible; it gives: *Kim is happier than Tim's – where the 
contraction misleadingly suggests possession, unlike such correct constructions as 'Sue's 
liking this'. Failure to communicate meaning may well be what discourages the child from 
reducing in such cases, besides the fact that she never hears it done in such contexts.  
 
2. Principles Not Required 
 
It is sometimes difficult to pick out what Chomsky is faulting, not only because his views 
have changed considerably over the years, but because of his lack of clarity. In speaking of 
language acquisition, Chomsky sometimes speaks of language not being acquired but at other 
times of principles not being acquired. So that when he claims children are seldom corrected 
by parents, one can easily disagree, but it is more difficult to disagree with the view that 
parents do not teach children linguistic principles, which leads Chomsky to conclude that 
these must be innate. For, on Chomsky's view – shared by nativists generally – to acquire a 
language, one must know the principles of language. Call this Chomsky's 'Principle 
Requirement'. The poverty of the stimulus argument crucially rests on this misleading 
requirement; that is, on the false assumption that the only way to acquire and use language in 
all its grammatical diversity is to know it in all its grammatical complexity. And as no child, 
                                                     
 
 
8 This paragraph is a faithful rendering of Anderson and Lightfoot (2000), 11. 
9 For fleshed-out arguments on this, see Hutto & Myin (2013), Glock (2013) and Hacker (2007). Hacker: 'It is 
common among psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists to speak of internal representations in the brain. In 
so far as ‘representation’ signifies no more than a causal correlate in the brain of an external stimulus, this is 
innocuous. But it is evident that all too frequently it is meant to signify a symbolic representation.  And it makes 
no sense to speak of semantic (symbolic) representations in the brain ... [f]or such representations are 
determined by conventions' (2007, 20-1). 
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or indeed adult, is ever taught all the grammatical complexity of language, we are forced to 
stipulate an innate universal grammar which endows the child with this complex knowledge – 
these principles – for how could she otherwise understand and speak her language?  
But surely the fact that children know language by age three need not imply that 
children know linguistic principles by age three; what it does – more plausibly – imply is that 
knowledge of linguistic principles is not needed at all to know or use a language. The idea 
that children learn languages by discerning grammatical principles – or indeed, that this is the 
only possible way of acquiring a language – is an unnecessary and unsubstantiated stipulation 
which goes against all we experience and witness about how native languages are learned; 
namely, by directed and undirected repeated exposure to use, in a multiplicity of contexts. 
This basic observation is fleshed out in diverse ways by empirical studies.  
Research shows that children systematize the language they hear based on the 
probability and frequency of forms, not on the basis of principles; they learn probabilistic 
patterns of word distributions, not syntactic rules; they generalize from cues, not from rules10. 
A series of experiments conducted by Hudson-Kam and Newport (2009) show that children 
ignore minor variations in linguistic input and reproduce only the most frequent forms – 
thereby regularizing and systematizing the inconsistent input and standardizing the language 
they hear around them. As Melodie Dye has also found:  
 
Young children ... act like finely-tuned antennas, picking up the dominant 
frequency in their surroundings and ignoring the static. Because of this – 
because toddlers tend to pick up on what is common and consistent, while 
ignoring what is variable and unreliable – they end up homing in on and 
reproducing only the most frequent patterns in what they hear. In doing so they 
fail to learn many of the subtleties and idiosyncrasies present in adult speech 
(they will come to learn or invent those later).  (2010)  
 
It is precisely this picking up of the dominant frequency that explains characteristic 
errors such as children adding the suffix '-ed' to irregular verbs to mark the past, as in: 'He 
hitted me'11. Such findings fit within a relatively new approach to language acquisition known 
                                                     
 
 
10 Studies in language development find that children use a wide variety of cues, including syntactic, semantic, 
and prosodic information, to learn language structure (Bates & MacWhinney, 1989). Bishop (2014): 'Current 
statistical learning accounts allow us to … study the process of language learning. Instead of assuming that 
children start with knowledge of linguistic categories, categories are abstracted from statistical regularities in the 
input (see Special Issue 3, Journal of Child Language 2010, vol. 37). The units of analysis thus change as the 
child develops expertise. And, consistent with the earlier writings of Bates and MacWhinney (1989), children's 
language is facilitated by the presence of correlated cues in the input, e.g., prosodic and phonological cues in 
combination with semantic context. In sharp contrast to the idea that syntax is learned by a separate modular 
system divorced from other information, recent research emphasises that the young language learner uses 
different sources of information together. Modularity emerges as development proceeds.' 
11 Whereas the Chomskyan explanation here is that the regularity of such errors, and the fact that they are not 
based upon what the child hears, demonstrate that they are derived from the Universal Grammar. The child 
allegedly works through from the simplest possibilities offered by the UG to the more complex, until his own 
grammar is the same as the grammar of the mother-tongue. But even if we were to grant Chomsky the 
occurrence of such cerebral gymnastics, how does he explain that many children go on making mistakes of this 
kind into adulthood? I heard a man laughing at his companion who had just used the word 'sped' rather than 
'speeded' (both are right), affirming that there's no such word. And how many of us are ever sure about when to 
use 'hung' or 'hanged'? It is bodies like the Académie Française, not UG, that legislate as to what is 
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as 'statistical learning'; as also 'similarity-based generalization' to explain how children are 
able to figure out how to use new words by generalizing about their use from similar words 
they already know how to use (Yarlett & Ramscar 2008). And of course, children also learn 
from repeated failure12. So that word learning is a probabilistic, success and error-driven 
process, rather than a process of implicit rule-application.  
Also, the nativist emphasis on the poverty of grammatical instruction and correction 
seems to rely on a restricted view of these. That children do not learn language with much in 
the way of overt instruction, as Fiona Cowie (2008) contends, is right if by this she means 
they are not taught linguistic principles or rules of syntax; but that they are often taught 
language is readily observable, as well as argued for by interactionist theorists of language 
acquisition, such as Lev Vygotsky's (with his notion of collaborative learning) and Jerome 
Bruner (with his Language Acquisition Support System)13. In fact, as Ted Schoneberger 
(2010) has shown, the crucial nativist claim that children find little linguistic reinforcement or 
corrective feedback is a myth. There is plenty of empirical evidence that children do 
encounter corrective data14. However, when presented with such evidence, Chomskians reject 
it on the grounds that whereas only some children are exposed to correct data, all children 
learn the correct rule. Indeed, a key justification for a Universal Grammar is that it explains 
why all children pick up the language correctly. As Green and Vervaecke write: 
 
... the single most important datum to capture when modelling language 
learning is that children virtually never fail to learn language correctly, 
regardless of what kind of linguistic data they are exposed to early in life. 
(1997) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 
grammatically legitimate, and what changes are accepted, though it has a reactive rather than generative role – 
the evolution of language being mostly the spontaneous upshot of language users. As Ramscar, Dye & 
McCauley have found: 'children’s overregularization errors both arise and resolve themselves as a consequence 
of the distribution of error in the linguistic environment, and … far from presenting a logical puzzle for learning, 
they are inevitable consequences of it' (2013, 760). 
12 Ramscar & Yarlett (2007) and Ramscar, Dye & McCauley (2013) show the importance of expectation and 
error-driven learning processes in language acquisition. For example, when children erroneously expect an 
ungrammatical form that then never occurs, the repeated absence of fulfilment serves as a kind of implicit 
negative feedback which encourages them to correct their errors over time. 
13 MacWhinney (1993) shows that language acquisition includes a 'rich armory of learning mechanisms' – 
including expressive and receptive monitoring, alongside competition, conservatism, complex, indirect and 
overt negative evidence, and cue construction – indicating that 'the logical problem of language learning is 
easily solved, and that there is really no logical problem of language acquisition at all'.  
14 Moerk (1994) conducted a meta-analysis of 40 studies and found substantial evidence that corrections do 
indeed play a role, and that they are not only abundant but contingent on the mistakes of the child.  Schoneberger 
(2010) cites findings that evidence (both positive and negative) available in the linguistic environment provides 
adequate constraints when learning a language. For example, children are provided positive evidence (a) when 
their grammatically correct utterances are directly reinforced by adults; (b) when their grammatically correct 
utterances are indirectly reinforced by adults by means of automatic reinforcement; and (c) when adults provide 
grammatically correct exemplars. Further, they are provided direct negative evidence when their grammatically 
incorrect utterances result in corrective feedback as well as indirect negative evidence by usually not being 
exposed to grammatically incorrect utterances. They also cite evidence to support the claim that reinforcement 
promotes language acquisition during naturally occurring parent-child verbal interactions. 
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I don't really know what to make of this; it sounds preposterous in that it is obvious that 
many children do fail to learn language correctly and that, in fact, many of them don't 
improve with age: a ride on the bus, a stroll in a shopping mall or even a university corridor 
or an hour of TV viewing will easily attest to the fact that many, if not most, people – 
children and grown children – do not speak grammatically correct English. For instance, we 
seem to be wiping out adverbs and are now doing 'amazing'. There is hardly a day when I 
don't hear some of the errors made in the following sentence: 'I'm feeling more better than I 
done yesterday though I'm not my bestest; but still, I should of went to the gym'. And other 
such common errors could be heard on the lips of many campaigning MPs, including Harriet 
Harman boasting about something 'we have showed [the country]' (2015 TV campaign 
appearance). Such errors are much too frequent and consistent to be dismissed as slips of the 
tongue. The point is not whether or not we ought to deplore this state of things – linguistic 
norms change15, like it or not – but that what we call 'grammatical' is not hard wired. 
Grammar is a mapping of language norms in use, not a map established in the brain in 
advance of all use, which linguists try to fathom. 
Neither we, nor our brain, rely on or need to know any principles to form a correct 
sentence. If Universal Grammar (innate principles) were there to guarantee that the correct 
parameter is set, why do children (and adults) not eventually systematically produce the 
correct version of what they hear? Why, when she lives in an adult community which 
regularly produces expressions such as 'Me and her went to the gym' or 'They hurt theirself', 
does the child use these mistaken expressions into adulthood? Or, alternatively correct herself 
if and when guided or exposed to correct usage. The number of adults who speak 
ungrammatically, and the fact that, as Dabrowska (2010) shows, agreement on well-
formedness of complex sentences is far from universal in adults, easily belie the claim that, 
unless our language organs are severely impaired, we are universally either actual or potential 
perfect grammatical users of our native languages. What we speak is what we learn. 
The poverty of stimulus argument took added impetus from findings by Derek 
Bickerton's examination of pidgins and creoles (1984). A pidgin has rudimentary grammar16; 
a creole is grammatically complex, but Bickerton found that the transition from one to the 
other is made within the space of one generation, and without the creole deriving its 
grammatical principles from the target language (that of the 'masters'), or from any of the 
substratum languages (one spoken by some subgroup of the labourers), suggesting that 
grammar is biologically hard-wired. Jean-Michel Fortis (2008) has shown Bickerton's 
evidence to be faulty. The complexification of Hawaiian pidgin seems to have been 
accomplished by speakers who were more or less passively bilingual, and therefore 
                                                     
 
 
15 There are of course many well-documented examples of this, such as changes in the grammar of Old English 
to that of Chaucer's Middle English. 
16 Pidgins are basic or proto-languages developed as a means of communication by adults who do not share a 
common language. They are syntactically-impoverished languages, characterized by reduced syntax and 
vocabulary, no fixed order of words, with considerable variation from one speaker to another. However, a 
pidgin can evolve into a creole, which is a full-blown language. The argument here is that inasmuch as a full-
blown language can be developed from an impoverished linguistic environment (with only vocabulary, but not 
grammatical principles drawn from a pidgin inasmuch as pidgins do not possess such principles in the first 
place), principles must be innate.  
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previously exposed to complex linguistic data; and new evidence shows that the 
complexification of pidgin to creole is not made within the space of one generation, but two17.  
Another argument in support of nativism is the alleged 'domain specificity' of the 
language faculty: its independence from other aspects of cognition. This dissociation of 
language from the rest of our cognitive abilities is said to be evidenced by children who are 
linguistically prolific and yet present impaired intelligence; and, inversely, by cases where 
language ability is impaired in the presence of otherwise normal cognitive ability. The latter 
is known as 'Speciﬁc Language Impairment'. It is conceded, by Anderson and Lightfoot, that 
the homogeneity of cases that have been grouped under the SLI diagnosis is quite 
controversial, but this does not prevent them from using the argument. The controversy, I 
believe, is mostly to do with cases of feral children as the main evidence in support of SLI. 
The claim being that feral children fail to develop language despite normal cognitive abilities 
and exposure to language. But the objection that flares up here must be: that normal cognitive 
abilities are attributed to feral children in the first place. If not retarded from infancy and 
abandoned because of this, the psychological and physical abuse feral children suffered is 
alone sufficient to preclude normal language development18. The child can hardly be seen as 
growing up in a nurturing environment; the lack of language acquisition in later life may be 
due to the results of a generally abusive environment before – but also after – it was found, as 
the teaching methods used are often limited, if not repressive: the child is kept in (often 
harsh) experimental conditions, taught a native language by mere ostensive teaching of words 
rather than normal exposure and habituation in a form of life. It seems to me, then, that what 
such cases demonstrate is that language is not separable from cognitive development 
generally.  
There is no space here to go into other kinds of case used to justify 'domain specificity', 
but as a general response, I would say two things: (1) there may be neural structures in the 
brain that are crucial to linguistic development, and the impairment of these may result in 
linguistic disabilities, but this neither justifies nor demands making those structures into a 
language acquisition device capable of storing and activating grammatical principles; (2) 
language acquisition is not separate from intelligence; it is one of our abilities that require 
                                                     
 
 
17 The transition occurring progressively. It is only in the second generation that pidgin is established, by 
speakers who have retained some of their native language. It is this stable and developed form of pidgin, 
constructed by the second generation, which gives birth to creole. The Hudson-Kam and Newport (2009) 
experiments mentioned earlier also suggest that creole languages do not support a universal grammar. In a 
pidgin situation (as also in the real-life situation of a deaf child whose parents were disfluent signers), children 
systematize the language they hear based on the probability and frequency of forms, and not on the basis of a 
universal grammar. 
18 I cannot expand on this here but the literature is abundant – the cases of Victor and Genie being the most 
notable. In Genie's case, psychological and physical trauma was caused by her father who physically punished 
by her father if she made any sounds (Curtiss et al 1997, 127). As for Victor, he presented insensitivity to any 
feelings except joy and anger (e.g., he never cried; his eyes were without expression); he was virtually 
insensitive to noise and his sensitivity to temperature was different from the norm (e.g., he did not react to 
boiling water); he was unable to distinguish between a painting and an object in relief, and could not undertake 
mundane tasks like opening a door. See Singleton & Ryan (2004) against the validity of feral cases in support of 
the SLI hypothesis. 
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intelligence, but whose structural impairment does not necessarily impair our other intelligent 
abilities. 
 
3. Chomsky's Universal Grammar: a hopeless monster19 
 
The idea of a Chomskyan-style universal grammar has been contested on linguistic, 
neurobiological and anthropological fronts. Studies in descriptive linguistics have shown that 
there is no universal set of principles determining language; it is diversity, rather than 
universals, that is found at almost every level of linguistic organization. In their target article, 
which summarizes decades of cross-linguistic work, Evans and Levinson (2009) show just 
how few and unprofound the universal characteristics of language are20, and how languages 
vary radically in sound, meaning, and syntactic organization. Where there are significant 
recurrent patterns in organization, these are better explained as stable engineering solutions 
satisfying multiple design constraints, reflecting both cultural-historical factors and the 
constraints of human cognition. So that '… the great variability in how languages organize 
their word-classes dilutes the plausibility of the innatist UG position' (2009, 429; 435). 
Research on syntax have brought Dunn et al to conclude that there is no universal set of rules 
determining the evolution of language; rather, it is cultural evolution that is the primary 
determinant of linguistic structure, at least with respect to word order (2011, 79).  
The notion of an innate structure of mind imposing 'universals' has also been rejected 
from a biological perspective. As Wolfram Hinzen affirms, there is no clue, empirically, 
about the type of rule that would be able to organize neuronal connections that enable 
language competence; there is no biology speciﬁc to language; no Universal Grammar rooted 
in the human genome (2012a, 636). This segues with Christiansen and Chater's findings: 'a 
biologically determined UG is not evolutionarily viable' in that the processes of language 
change are much faster than processes of genetic change, so that language constitutes a 
'moving target' both over time and across different human populations and cannot therefore 
provide a stable environment to which language genes could have adapted (2008, 489). And 
Terence Deacon abundantly demonstrates that Chomsky's scenario is unsupported by 
evolutionary anthropology which evidences a gradual adaptation of the human brain and 
vocal chords to the use of language rather than the sudden appearance of a language organ 
containing a complete set of parameters enabling all grammars21 – Chomsky's 'Big Bang' 
theory22.  
                                                     
 
 
19 A wink at what biologists call a 'hopeful monster' theory, described by Deacon as 'the evolutionary theorist's 
counterpart to divine intervention, in which a freak mutation just happens to produce a radically different and 
serendipitously better-equipped organism. The single most influential "hopeful monster" theory of human 
language evolution was offered by the linguist Noam Chomsky' (1997, 35).   
20 Views that espouse some universality don't need to appeal to nativism: Christiansen & Chater (2008) hold a 
non-formal conception of universals in which these emerge. 
21 This is echoed by Christiansen & Chater (2008) whose research finds that it is non-linguistic constraints that 
have shaped language to the brain, and given rise to statistical tendencies in language structure and use. The 
question is not 'Why is the brain so well suited to learning language?', but 'Why is language so well suited to 
being learned by the brain?' Following Darwin, they argue that 'it is useful metaphorically to view languages as 
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'Don't think, but look!' (PI 66), writes Wittgenstein. By this, he means that we should 
draw our accounts of human life from life, from what we do rather than from presuppositions 
often generated by false analogies that lead to false requirements. And what we do shows that 
language acquisition is not due to the activation of principles but to the acquisition of a 
technique, a know-how, an ability. Children are not mini-grammarians. They don't need to 
'cognize' and apply the Location Principle or any grammatical principle to acquire language. 
They use words in the same way we play tennis, without knowing what the mechanics are. 
Stipulating a Principle Requirement creates a problem where none was there, and appealing 
to innateness fabricates a solution where none is needed. Rather than 'language growing in us' 
– as Chomsky would have it – it is we who physiologically, psychologically and socially 
grow into language23.  
We can now move on to Wittgenstein, whose view of language development – in contrast 
to Chomsky's 'Big Bang' theory – seems to me ontogenetically and phylogenetically 
consistent and coherent. 
 
4. Wittgenstein's Social Account of Language Acquisition  
 
4.1 The Primitivity of Action: the deed, not the word 
  
'In the beginning was the deed' 
Wittgenstein, quoting Goethe (OC 402)  
 
One of the important things Wittgenstein said about language is that it has its root in gesture 
– or, as he also put it, in 'action', and more precisely: 'reaction' or 'instinct': 'What we call 
meaning must be connected with the primitive language of gestures' (BT 24). By this, he 
means instinctive gestures and reactions which – first through evolution, then through 
enculturation – get replaced by words. This – Wittgenstein's 'primitivism' (Canfield 1997, 
258) – prompted Michael Tomasello to realize that '[i]f we want to understand human 
communication, … we cannot begin with language'; contrary to primatologist dogma, apes' 
gestures, not their vocalizations, are the precursors of human language (2008, 59; 53-5)24.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 
'organisms' – that is, highly complex systems of interconnected constraints – that have evolved in a symbiotic 
relationship with humans' (2008, 490). 
22 This view of the sudden appearance of language as a kind of evolutionary accident where humans, to the 
exclusion of all other animals, were somehow accidentally blessed with a fully functioning prefabricated 
language organ (see Chomsky 1988) has been found, Green & Vervaecke (1997) concede, hardly plausible. 
However, they retort: 'ironically, … the real Big Bang theory is, as far as we now know, true! A substantial 
critique of the implausibility of 'catastrophic' or 'big bang' theories of brain evolution to account for humans' 
unique linguistic capacity can be found in Deacon (1997). 
23 Chomsky is averse to saying that language acquisition is a learning at all; it is, to him, more akin to growing 
than to learning: 'In certain fundamental respects we do not really learn language; rather grammar grows in the 
mind' (1980a, 134); 'language development really ought to be called language growth because the language 
organ grows like any other body organ' (1983). Cook & Newson: 'Acquisition of language is, to Chomsky, 
learning in a peculiar sense: … it is not like learning to ride a bicycle, where practice develops and adapts 
existing skills. Instead it is internal development in response to vital, but comparatively trivial, experience from 
outside' (2007, 185). 
24 For an aperçu of Wittgenstein's impact in the field of language acquisition, see Nelson (2009). 
12 
 
 
 
When Wittgenstein writes that '[t]he study of language games is the study of primitive 
forms of language or languages' (BB 17), he does not, by this, mean words or symbols, but 
reactions:  
 
The origin and the primitive form of the language game is a reaction; only 
from this can more complicated forms develop. 
Language – I want to say – is a refinement. 'In the beginning was the deed.' 
(CE 395)  
 
Language, then, is a refinement, or 'an extension', of our primitive behaviour25; it 
emerges from the development of some of our animal or natural reactions. Not just any 
natural reaction – not singular or idiosyncratic ones, like tics – but our shared natural 
reactions; what Wittgenstein calls 'the common behaviour of mankind' (PI 206): reactions 
such as crying when in pain or sad; smiling when glad; jumping when startled; gasping or 
screaming when afraid; but also reacting to someone's suffering. He writes: 
 
In its most primitive form [the language-game] is a reaction to somebody's 
cries and gestures, a reaction of sympathy or something of the sort. (CE 414) 
 
These instinctive common reactions or action patterns are, Wittgenstein says, the 
prototypes of our modes of thought (RPP I, 916); of our concepts. And so, the basis for the 
development of language is constituted by a number of such distinct instinctive, behavioural 
patterns which John Canfield calls 'proto-language games' (1996, 128). Without these 
behavioural patterns, there would be no language26. This is the case phylogenetically as well 
as ontogenetically; for these natural configurations of behaviour – such as: '[t]he natural, 
untutored behaviour of one pre-linguistic hominid helping another it sees is hurt' – are part of 
the species’ inheritance' (ibid.). So that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. 
 
4.2 Training 
 
In the Investigations, Wittgenstein writes that the primitive forms of language are those used 
by the child when it is learning to talk and that, here, 'the teaching of language is not 
explanation, but training' (PI 5). Why? For an obvious reason: in the learning of a first 
language, the initiate has only instinct and reactions but no language at her disposal, and so 
                                                     
 
 
25 'Being sure that someone is in pain, doubting whether he is, and so on, are so many natural, instinctive kinds 
of behaviour towards other human beings, and our language is merely an auxiliary to, and further extension of, 
this relation. Our language-game is an extension of primitive behaviour.' (Z 545). 'What, however, is the word 
"primitive" meant to say here? Presumably, that the mode of behaviour is pre-linguistic: that a language-game is 
based on it: that it is the prototype of a mode of thought and not the result of thought.' (RPP I, 916). 
Wittgenstein speaks of primitive or animal behaviour in the phylogenetic as well as the ontogenetic sense. Here 
is an illustration of the phylogenetic primitivity of our concepts: '(An ape who tears apart a cigarette, for 
example. We don't see an intelligent dog do such things. The mere act of turning an object all around and 
looking it over is a primitive root of doubt' (RPP II, 345). 
26 Wittgenstein: 'it is characteristic of our language that the foundation on which it grows consists in steady ways 
of living, regular ways of acting' (CE 397; my emphasis). Our acquiring concepts, such as pain, requires that we 
have appropriate (i.e. normal) human reactions: 'If a child looked radiant when it was hurt, and shrieked for no 
apparent reason, one couldn't teach him to use the word "pain"' (LPP 37). 
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the learning of a native language will have to do with action or behaviour – language at first 
playing only a background music role. This is why language cannot take its impetus from 
explanation: 'Language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination' (OC 475). 
Language, then, is an extension of our patterned non-linguistic behaviour through 
training. On Wittgenstein's view, this should include at least one competent trainer – that is, a 
reasonably adept user of the language, endowed with enough pedagogic ability to mould or 
shape the child's responses to the training so that they end up in harmony with the norm27. Of 
course, by 'training' here, is not meant anything formal but the kind of repeated direct and 
indirect guidance that is effected through intersubjective interaction in various contexts. More 
formal teaching may – it does not always – come later28. But it is clear that for Wittgenstein, 
language acquisition is not a one-track affair: he rejects the Augustinian view of it as 
resulting from a mere nominalization process, and describes it in terms of habituation and 
enculturation. 
So how is the child trained to go from proto-language games to language, from her 
instinctive reactions to language? '… how, asks Wittgenstein, is the connexion between the 
name and the thing set up?' – and he replies: 
 
This question is the same as: how does a human being learn the meaning of 
the names of sensations? – of the word 'pain' for example. Here is one 
possibility: words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of 
the sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and 
then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They 
teach the child new pain-behaviour. (PI 244) 
 
So the connection between the name and the thing is not made by an act of ostension, 
not by merely hooking gestures on to their public referents, but by processes of drill or 
habituation that are similar to stimulus-response conditioning, but that must be supplemented 
by training into the practice in which those words are used29. Note: what the child is taught in 
learning to replace his primitive reactions with words is new behaviour; that is, in first 
picking up the linguistic expression, the child is not describing with it or referring with it, but 
still reacting with it.  
Ostensive teaching, as opposed to mere ostensive definition, involves behavioural 
conditioning: the child is taught, through repetition and exercises, to utter certain words in 
certain contexts or situations. These drills are used to tap and channel the child’s natural 
reactions. What we witness in these initial stages is not yet language, but 'processes 
                                                     
 
 
27 On Philippe Narboux' view, training is a necessary but insufficient condition for the learning of a native 
language whereas second-language acquisition doesn't require it, and can rely on nothing other than ostensive 
definition because it relies on previous training (2004, 136).  
28 Once the child has some language, there will be more explanatory teaching, and perhaps the odd transmission 
of some linguistic principles (though not usually of the 'clitic' sort). Wittgenstein talks about teaching as well as 
training: (e.g. Z 318 & 186). 
29 Cf. Medina (2002), 173. As psychologist Derek Montgomery also observes, if the carer repeatedly uses the 
verb 'want' while interpreting the infant's behaviour in certain contexts, it is 'reasonable to suspect that when the 
verb emerges in the child's lexicon it will be in familiar contexts such as [those] where the child has repeatedly 
heard it being used. The meaning of the term, like the meaning of the prelinguistic gesturing, is bound up in the 
role it plays within such contexts’ (2002, 372). 
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resembling language' (PI 7); for a language is not the mere repetition of certain sounds in 
certain contexts and after certain prompts. Wittgenstein is not a behaviourist. Drill is not 
enough; beyond mere conditioning (cf. PI 6), a normative attitude towards utterances, 
towards how things are to be done, must be inculcated in the child, so that it can learn to 
regulate itself30. And acquiring a normative attitude demands nothing less than being 
enculturated. It is thanks to her acquiring this normative attitude that the child is eventually 
able to go on, on her own; to proceed from other-regulation to self-regulation (Medina 2002, 
165). Successful enculturation means the child can then judge for herself that in a particular 
instance a word or phrase makes sense, not by comparing it to a benchmark, context-free, use 
but on the basis of her experience of multiple language-games in which the word or phrase is 
employed. For Wittgenstein, the acquisition of language is the acquisition of a technique, 
skill or capacity, and capacities are flexible to individual and occasion; they allow for – and 
indeed, are basic to – productivity and creativity.  
 
5. Technique: Wittgenstein's answer to the productivity problem 
 
To understand a language means to be master of a 
technique.  
Wittgenstein (PI 199) 
 
So that 'technique', I suggest, is Wittgenstein's answer to the nativist problem of productivity, 
which is how to account for our capacity to produce an unlimited number of novel utterances 
from the limited set of grammatical rules and the finite set of terms we acquire from 
experience. On Wittgenstein's view, we are we able to extend our limited acquired knowledge 
of language to new situations and contexts precisely because the teaching of language is not a 
teaching of principles but the transmission of a technique, which does not aim for total 
regulation, but for self-regulation. 
It is criteria that determine whether a speaker is following a rule or using a word in 
accordance with the norm that is being inculcated. These criteria are public, not private; they 
can be transmitted to the child and invoked to guide and correct him in his attempts to use the 
words he is being taught. The child's various attempts are guided (encouraged/discouraged) 
until enough training allows her to grasp what sorts of contexts are propitious for the use of 
the word: semantic development involves precisely 'becoming increasingly sensitive to how 
characteristics of different contexts constrain the words one can use' (Montgomery 2002, 
373)31. However, though constraint is necessary, there is no exhaustive determination of use 
                                                     
 
 
30 'Our children are not only given practice in calculation but are also trained to adopt a particular attitude 
towards a mistake in calculating [variant: '... towards a departure from the norm']' (RFM VII 61, p. 425) – that 
is, children are habituated into standards of correctness of the practice in question, and thereby formed to act and 
react in particular ways; they are thus trained to master a technique.  
31 For Chomsky, in contrast, our words are informed by the brain; they get their meaning from internal meanings 
(which are abstract mental representations), and it is the brain that communicates meaning: the human mind 
bridges the gap between external sounds and internal meanings (which are abstract mental representations) via a 
'computational system' that relates meanings to sequences of sounds in one direction and sequences of sounds to 
meanings in the mind in the other. The mind changes the representation of language used by the computational 
system into the general concepts used by the mind, called 'the conceptual-intentional system', i.e. moon is 
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but an indication of proper use (the use is constrained, not shackled), which allows for and 
explains creativity/productivity.  
We might make an analogy here with a dog that is trained not to bite: the dog will not 
only not bite the people present at the training, but not bite in all similar contexts (e.g. 
unthreatening contexts). Or again, when the child is taught to open a door, she doesn't just 
learn to open that white, single panelled door which her mother is using to teach her, but all 
doors that she will come across in experience – whether they be white, black, double-
panelled, glass and so on. This is where the teaching of a technique surpasses, say, ostensive 
definition. As Wittgenstein writes: 
 
Teaching which is not meant to apply to anything but the examples given is 
different from that which 'points beyond' them.32 (PI 208) 
 
To suggest that we need a Language Acquisition Device to explain how we can 
produce an unlimited number of new and correct sentences from limited input is like 
suggesting we need a Manoeuvre Acquisition Device to explain the potentially unlimited 
variety of manoeuvres that a cyclist is able to execute from the basic or limited training he 
has received (cf. Rorty 2004, 225). Wittgenstein’s answer to the productivity problem is 
encapsulated in this passage: 'Yes, there is the great thing about language – that we can do 
what we haven't learnt' (LPP 28). 
So that, contra Chomsky, first-language acquisition is essentially social; it requires that 
at least one member of the linguistic community mould the child's primitive reactions and 
proto-language games into language-games, bringing the child, through a process of 
enculturation, to assimilate, conform to and apply the standards of correctness of its linguistic 
community. Acquiring language is like learning to walk: the child is stepped into language by 
an initiator and, after much hesitation and repeated faltering, with time, multifarious practice 
and repeated exposure, it disengages itself from its teacher's hold and is able, as it were, to 
run with the language. 
 
6 Training is not enough 
 
This may be a good time to bring up Chomsky's argument that while human babies and 
animals can both be trained, if they are exposed to exactly the same linguistic data, the human 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 
connected to the concept of 'earth’s satellite'. Going in the opposite direction, while speaking the mind has to 
convert the concepts into linguistic representation for the computational system, i.e. 'earth’s satellite' is 
converted into moon. (Cook & Newson 2007, 6). In contrast to this mentalist view, for Wittgenstein (echoed 
here by Montgomery), it is in social practices that the meaning of words and the standards for their use are 
established. Meaning, as Wittgenstein says, is 'in use' – out there – not in the head, not in some mental 
repository. 
32 Wittgenstein's rule-following argument shows precisely that generating new sentences is nothing but an 
instance of knowing how to go on, 'how to extend the speech that [we] have into new contexts' (Bruner 1983, 
39). As H.-J. Glock notes, the early Wittgenstein's was also concerned with what is now known as the problem 
of 'the creativity of language': the number of propositions being indefinite although the number of words is finite 
(NL 98; TLP 4.02, 4.027 etc.) (1996, 298).   
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child will acquire language, but the kitten will not. For Chomsky, to suggest that language is 
not innate is to imply that no crucial and relevant internal nature differentiates a child from a 
rock or a rabbit; so that if we put a rock, a rabbit and a child in an English-speaking 
community, they should all be able to learn English (Chomsky 2000). It is in order to avoid 
coming to this conclusion, he says, that we must accept that the relevant capacity the child 
has which the stone and rabbit lack is the 'language acquisition device' (LAD). But this, I 
suggest, is like using a hammer to crack an egg. We hardly need resort to a language 
acquisition device to mark a difference here – internal or otherwise – between humans and 
animals (to say nothing of rocks). Before resorting to something as ad hoc as a language 
organ to account for the difference, we might, for a start, evoke obvious, traceable 
physiological requirements such as the anatomical structures necessary for the vocalization of 
human speech that are lacking in rabbits and rocks. Or indeed as Elizabeth Bates does, to 
differences between human brains and, say, those of chimpanzees, but differences – she 
insists – that do not require us to postulate a language organ (1993, 8). However, the 
difference is not only physiological33. 
Rebecca Saxe, a cognitive scientist at MIT, argues that the key difference between apes 
and humans seems to be that we have explicit teaching while animals have only imitation. 
Chimps may use sticks as rudimentary tools, but they learn such skills through observation 
and mimicry as well as trial and error, rather than direct instruction. Humans learn through all 
of these, but teaching may be the signature skill of our species. Also, a part of teaching is 
'triadic attention': being able to work out the coordination of my attention and the other 
person's attention on this third thing: the task I'm trying to teach. I have to pay attention to all 
three elements continuously. Finally, it seems like 'it's not just a cognitive capacity that's 
necessary for teaching; there's this other thing, which is wanting to teach. That may be even 
more critical. We need to understand that somebody else is unable to do what we're doing, 
and also have some reason, motivation, desire to help that person learn it. As Saxe says: 'That 
desire to teach seems to be really pervasive in humans and may be mysteriously missing in 
apes' (2008). Humans have both the passion and the mental skill to teach each other.  
So that the inability for rabbits and stones to speak and teach goes some way in 
explaining why they don't acquire language and we do. But also the fact that children expect 
(and like) to be taught makes a vital difference, and this is visible in their capacity for 
attention. Though the learner's triadic attention is a development, attention for teaching 
appears before language kicks in. Apes can't get into that; although they do things together 
and coordinate their actions together, they have no shared goals based on shared 
commitment. Kids, on the other hand, have these naturally, almost immediately.  
Another distinguishing feature of humans is what John Haugeland calls 'norm-
hungriness' (2002, 22) – an expectation of norms that parents try to teach us.  Haugeland 
                                                     
 
 
33 Actually, the deeper confusion here is that unless we assume that language is innate, exposure to English 
would have to result in the child, the rabbit and the rock learning English. As Witt said:  'If a lion could talk, we 
wouldn't be able to understand it' (PPF 327), for he wouldn't – couldn't – speak 'human'. Learning human 
speak (e.g., English) – takes enculturation in a human form of life, and that presupposes shared behavioural 
reactions and responses. I won't even bother about the rock ...  
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claims the fundamental divide between humans and animals lies in our essential use of 
norms. Humans display a norm-susceptibility, and a deep 'norm-hungriness'; deep, both in 
that the desire is almost insatiable, and in that the norms are unique in their richness and 
complexity (ibid., 31).  
 
7. Wittgenstein's universal grammar 
 
I'd like to conclude this paper by suggesting that we replace Chomsky's universal grammar 
with Wittgensteinian grammar. Inasmuch as the latter is all the grammar we require to 
possess a language, and inasmuch as its acquisition can only be achieved through 
enculturation, it makes an otiose monster out of Chomsky's hopeful monster.  
As linguist Dan Everett (2012) says: 'universal grammar doesn't seem to work, there 
doesn't seem to be much evidence for that'; but what, he asks, can we put in its place? His 
answer is a Wittgensteinian one: 'A complex interplay of factors, of which culture, the values 
human beings share, plays a major role in structuring the way that we talk and the things that 
we talk about'. In view of the implausibility of Chomsky's UG34, Wolfram Hinzen seeks to 
rehabilitate universal grammar as internally linked to human nature, without that centrally 
involving notions of innateness, essence or modularity (2012b, 55). Gone is the idea of 
grammar as an autonomous module described by arbitrary formal rules; grammatical theory 
is a theory of the mode of thought that we ﬁnd expressed in human language and that is 
manifest in human culture (2012a, 643). Hinzen's view of grammar seems apt to resonate 
with Wittgenstein's in that Wittgensteinian grammar is a description of the rules or bounds of 
sense that determine, and are embedded in, our use of language as a result of the evolution of 
languages in the various cultures of human life. 
For Wittgenstein, there is no question that language depends on grammar; but 
Wittgensteinian grammar is a different animal from Chomsky's. Whereas Chomsky construes 
grammar as a set of arbitrary principles existing in advance of use or practice, for 
Wittgenstein, it is not principles, but rules or norms that are necessary to the existence of a 
language, and these do not pre-exist language but are inextricably bound up with its practice. 
As John Canfield puts it: 'The practice underlies the rule rather than vice-versa' (1975, 114), 
which is to say that grammatical rules merely express or bring out our normative use of 
words and expressions. In fact, rules of grammar, as Wittgenstein conceives them, are 
nothing like linguistic principles; they are garden-variety or ordinary expressions (reminders) 
of the norms that have been regulating our meaningful use of words (e.g., 'A bachelor is an 
unmarried man'; 'This is what we call a table'; 'Red is darker than pink'; 'A rod has a length'). 
The child assimilates these norms as it assimilates the language – through guidance (which 
may, but need not, involve explicit reminders of the norms) in, and exposure to, correct 
usage. 
Learning the meaning of a word is nothing but learning how it is used; that is, 
assimilating the norms that govern its use – what Wittgenstein calls its grammar. We could 
                                                     
 
 
34 Hinzen: '… controversies about UG abound and the enterprise is widely rejected as ill-conceived and 
unfounded' (2012a, 335n). 
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not speak of the number of people in a room if we did not have a norm- or rule-governed use 
of the words 'people', 'number' and 'room'. So that if I were to say that I have counted 30 
people in the room, of whom two dogs and a cat, I would not be using the words 'people', 
'dog' and 'cat' correctly. I would not be speaking grammatically. Grammatical norms 
determine what it makes sense for us to say also by excluding certain combinations of words 
from meaningful use35. 
The grammatical rules I have been describing are what we might call 'thin' and 'local': 
they are norms for the use of words, expressions, and numbers36 ('2+2=4' is for Wittgenstein 
as much a rule of grammar as 'A rod has a length'). But Wittgenstein came to realize that 
many of our grammatical rules are 'thick' or 'reality-soaked'37: they are conditioned by 
empirical reality. So, for example: 'The earth has existed for a long time'; 'Human beings 
have bodies'; 'If someone's head is cut off, he is dead and will never live again'; 'Babies 
cannot look after themselves'; 'Human beings are born, grow old and die; they need air, water 
and sleep; they usually smile or laugh when they're happy; cry when they're sad or in pain'.  
Now of course Wittgenstein is well aware that these look like run-of-the mill empirical 
propositions, not expressions of rules of grammar. Yet he notices that these are propositions 
about which 'no doubt can exist if making judgments is to be possible at all', and so they do 
not, in fact, function as empirical propositions38 but as logical propositions: they 'form the 
foundation of all operating with thoughts (with language)' (OC 401). Failing, in our language-
games, to 'assume' the indubitability of such propositions would result in a failure to make 
sense: for an English speaker to ask, in a non-sci-fi context, whether 'human beings have 
bodies' would be as nonsensical as asking whether a 'rod has a length'. Either question would 
make us suspect, first, the speaker's proficiency in English and if that were ascertained, her 
sanity. Inasmuch, then, as our language-games are logically hinged on such putative 
'propositions', Wittgenstein takes them to have a grammatical role ('logical' and 'grammatical' 
are synonymous for the later Wittgenstein). Such 'propositions' are in fact expressions of 
rules of grammar.  
Their seemingly empirical nature is due to these rules of grammar being conditioned by 
‘very general facts of nature’ appertaining to 'the natural history of human beings'39 (PI 230, 
                                                     
 
 
35 Wittgenstein does not think his conception of grammar contrasts with the grammarian's; he insists that 'any 
explanation of the use of language' is 'grammar' (MWL 69). On his view, 'A rod has no length' is as 
ungrammatical as 'A rod length has'; but as he concedes (to Moore), the former violation of grammar is of 
interest only to the philosopher (ibid.), whereas syntax – albeit also part of grammar – is not the part 
philosophers are interested in. Wittgenstein leaves it to grammarians to bring out the syntactic aspect of use. 
Grammarians and philosophers may find it of interest to map grammatical rules, but this does not make the 
apprehension of rules as such relevant to language acquisition. In picking up the correct syntactico-semantic use 
of language – its grammar – the child is not picking up rules as such, but simply, to repeat: correct use.  
36 I am generalising for simplicity's sake. For a more nuanced view of Wittgenstein's conception of grammatical 
rules, see Glock (1996), 150-55, and Moyal-Sharrock (2004). 
37 I owe this expression to Bernard Harrison (1991, 58). 
38'That is, we are interested in the fact that about certain empirical propositions no doubt can exist if making 
judgments is to be possible at all. Or again: I am inclined to believe that not everything that has the form of an 
empirical proposition is one.' (OC 308) 
39 Note: conditioned, not justified by facts or inferred from them. This is what precludes their being empirical 
propositions. Rules are not empirically or epistemically grounded in reality, though they may be 'caused' by 
reality (OC 131, 429, 474). This is why Wittgenstein writes: 'The rule we lay down is the one most strongly 
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415): 'it is characteristic of our language that the foundation on which it grows consists in 
steady ways of living, regular ways of acting' (CE 397). Their being conditioned by facts that 
unassailably pertain to the human form of life makes them universal rules of grammar – that 
is, laws of thought belonging to the 'scaffolding of thought' of any normal human being. They 
are the bounds of sense from which any human being must begin to make sense40. Such rules, 
I suggest, constitute alongside our local grammars, a universal grammar41. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
We have seem that Chomsky's UG faces multiple objections from multiple fronts – 
objections it cannot answer. This, however, has not managed to take the wind out of UG's 
sails42. Myths are difficult to debunk. For, if anything transpires from even a glance at 
Chomsky's position, it's that it does have the trappings of myth. On the other hand, 
Wittgenstein's conception of language acquisition – resulting as it does from observations so 
basic as to be incontestable – is of the order of 'perspicuous presentation'; it merely makes 
obvious the familiar unseen: 'We want to understand something that is already in plain view. 
For this is what we seem in some sense not to understand' (PI 89).  
There is nothing mysterious, speculative or ad hoc about Wittgenstein's view of 
language acquisition: no positing of hidden principles lodged in the brain and requiring 
'cognisance'; all that is needed is the (plain-to-see) ability to be initiated in and master the 
technique of language through enculturation. Any more detail than this must be left to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 
suggested by the facts of experience' (AWL 84). For clarification regarding the nonempirical nature of 'thick' 
rules of grammar, see Moyal-Sharrock (2013).  
40 Some people may hold beliefs that seem to violate – and so could not condition – universal rules of grammar. 
For example, in the Trobriand Islands, some women, called Yoyova or flying witches, are believed to have the 
capacity to fly. It is, however, also (accommodatingly) believed that they either leave their bodies behind when 
they do this, or have doubles in the form of fire-flies etc. do it for them (Young, 207). The universal rule of 
grammar: 'Human beings cannot fly unaided' is therefore not actually transgressed. Any attempt to ignore or 
transgress it in action – such as a yoyova attempting to actually fly off a cliff (without 'leaving her body behind') 
– must be seen as pathological. For any local belief that seems to violate a universal rules of grammar, such 
accommodating measures will always be found. There is no normal transgression of a universal rule. To 
genuinely think or act on the basis of such rules of thought as – 'I can fly unaided' or 'Only I exist' is a 
pathological problem, not a doxastic option. See Moyal-Sharrock (2007) for a discussion of local and universal 
rules of grammar drawn from On Certainty. 
41 They are conditioned by 'extremely general facts of nature – such facts as are hardly ever mentioned because 
of their great generality' (PI, p. 56) – including the 'common behaviour of mankind' – behaviours such as 
breathing, eating, walking, hoping, dying, speaking, thinking, giving orders, asking questions, telling stories, 
having a chat. It is this common behaviour that constitutes the universal 'system of reference' which conditions 
what might be called, though in obvious contrast to Chomsky, the 'universal grammar' of mankind – that 
grammar by means of which any human being can understand a foreign language (PI 206). 
42 As Vyvyen Evans testifies, Chomsky's views are 'established fact in many of the linguistics textbooks 
currently in use in many of the stellar universities throughout the English-speaking world. I was trained using 
these textbooks, and they are still compulsory reading for today’s undergraduate and graduate students – 
tomorrow’s researchers, educators and language professionals – even at the university where I teach and work. 
University students are regularly told that there is a Universal Grammar, that language is innate, that language is 
incommensurable with non-human communication systems, and that all languages are essentially English-like' 
(2014, 19-20). 
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empirical research, but of the non-mythopeic kind43 – the kind, instead, that Ramscar and 
Yarlett are gesturing at here: 
 
Language is ultimately a cultural capacity (Tomasello, 1999; Wittgenstein, 
1953 [PI]); arguably, it is the capacity for culture that sets Homo sapiens apart 
from our closest neighbors. Understanding how the processes of imitation that 
appear to be key to the acquisition and establishment of cultural common 
ground interact with the processes that allow humans to exert more cognitive 
control over their responses, and thus achieve agency across the course of 
cognitive development, may ultimately result in a much deeper understanding 
of our capacity for, and the nature of, both language and culture. (2007, 952) 
 
Constancy of meaning, linguistic communication and expression are made possible 
by a grammar, but this grammar is not a set of innate linguistic principles biologically 
programmed in our brains in advance of all use, and enabling the inner growth of language. 
In contrast to Chomsky's grammar, there is nothing inexplicable about Wittgenstein's 
grammar. On his view, human grammar is internally related to human life and action – this is 
what his concept of the language-game conveys, as well as his often-reiterated conviction that 
'at the beginning is the deed'. If universality is the motivating force behind nativism, there is 
in our shared natural history and in our shared instinctive reactions, universality enough. Our 
grammars are embedded in our use of language and conditioned by our forms of life; it is 
therefore in the 'stream of life' – and not in the human brain – that Wittgenstein rightly locates 
these grammars. 
                                                     
 
 
43 That it is necessary to have a well-functioning brain to achieve language acquisition does not make the brain 
the locus of language acquisition – or part of it, a 'language organ'. The brain is a mere mechanical enabler: its 
proper functioning is necessary to our acquiring and using language in the same way it is necessary to our ability 
to walk or digest – without it implying the existence of walking and digestion organs in the brain. 
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